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Comments

THIRD PARTY INDEMNITY CONTRACTS t
I. INTRODUCTION
The term, "indemnity", has been used to illustrate a variety
of legal relationships.' For example, "indemnity" has been used
to illustrate: (1) an original, independent contract to save the
indemnitee from contingent loss of a specified character; 2 (2) a
right to recover for injuries;3 (3) an implied right of reimburse4
ment owed to one who has discharged the debt of another.
This article discusses indemnity contracts given by third persons as security for sureties on contracts between two other persons. For example: S, a surety, guaranties the performance of
a contract between P, the principal, and C, the creditor. X, indemnitor, agrees with S to pay the amount of any loss incurred
by S on the suretyship obligation. This legal relationship will
be termed "the four party situation" for the purposes of discussion in this article.5
II. THE INDEMNITY CONTRACT
Those requirements necessary to make any contract enforceable are similarly applicable to a contract of indemnity. Under
this section only the following more troublesome requisites of an
indemnity contract are discussed: (A) Statute of frauds; (B) capacity of persons and corporations to execute an indemnity contract; (C) consideration; (D) construction of the indemnity cont Contribution of funds by the Universal Surety Company of Lincoln,
Nebraska, has made this study possible.
I See Arnold, Indemnity Contracts and the Statute of Frauds, 9 MINN.
L. REV. 401, 413 (1925); Comment, 44 YALE L.J. 1053 (1935), note
2; Treanor, The Rationale of Corporate and Non-Corporate Suretyship Decisions, 3 IND. LJ. 105, 213-15 (1927).
2 Hall v. Equitable Surety Co., 126 Ark. 535, 191 S.W. 32 (1917).
3
4

5

Proctor v. Dillon, 235 Mass. 538, 546, 129 N.E. 265, 269 (1920).
U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Centropolis Bank, 17 F.2d 913, 916
(8th Cir. 1927).
A suretyship relationship involves three parties; the surety, creditor
and principal. The relationship which is the subject of this article
merely adds one party to the suretyship relation; the surety's indemnitor.

374
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tract; and (E) public policy affecting the validity of an indemnity
contract.
A.

STATUTE OF FRAUDS

Courts disagree whether an agreement to indemnify a surety
is a contract to answer for the debt or default of another person."
The typical situation which results in conflicting decisions is
where P, contractor, desires to bid on a job let for bid by C. P
must obtain a surety bond executed by a surety in favor of C
before P's bid will be accepted. S, surety, will not execute the
surety bond unless X, a third person, executes a contract agreeing to indemnify S against any loss suffered under its obligation
on the surety bond. It should be noted that S is an obligor in
so far as he is obligated to C on the surety bond, but an obligee
in so far as P is expressly or impliedly obligated to indemnify him
against loss suffered on the suretyship obligation.
Since P is obligated to indemnify S, a minority of courts construe X's promise of indemnity to be a contract to answer for
P's obligation of indemnity to S and hence a contract to answer
for the debt or default of P.7
The majority of courts, including Nebraska," hold X's promise
to indemnify S is not a promise within the statute of frauds. 9 The
reasons generally set forth by the courts following this view are:
6 NEB. REV. STAT. § 36-202(2) (Reissue 1952).
7 2 Williston, Contracts § 482 (rev. ed. 1936):

"It is in regard to promises to indemnify those who become sureties for the debts of third
persons, given as an inducement to the sureties for entering into the
obligation that the question has given rise to the greatest difficulty.
In the first place it must be asked: Was the principal debtor also
bound to indemnify the surety? If so, even though that promise is
an implied one, the new promisor is entering into an identical obligation which should be subject to the same rule which governs all
promises to satisfy the obligations of another." See also, Burdick,
Suretyship and the Statute of Frauds, 20 COL. L. REV. 153 (1920);
Hurt v. Ford, 142 Mo. 283, 44 S. W. 228 (1898); Easter v. White, 12
Ohio St. 219 (1861). Even the minority courts will hold the oral contract enforceable if there is a direct benefit accruing to the promisor;
Garner v. Hudgins, 46 Mo. 399 (1870).
8 Minick v. Huff, 41 Neb. 516, 59 N.W. 795 (1894).
9 See an excellent article, Corbin, Contracts of Indemnity and the Statute of Frauds,41 HARV. L. REV. 689 (1928); Annot., 1 A. L. R. 383
(1919); Mills v. Brown, 11 Iowa 314 (1860); Patton v. Mills, 21 Kan.
163 (1878); George v. Hoskins, 30 S.W. 406 (1895); Dyer v. Staggs,
217 Ky. 683, 290 S. W. 494 (1927); Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Lawler,
64 Minn. 144, 66 N.W. 143 (1896); Rose v. Wollenberg, 31 Ore. 269, 44
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1) there would be a great injustice to allow X to plead the statute
of frauds after S, relying on the indemnity agreement, has executed a surety bond; 2) there is little danger of fraud because
if X did not agree to indemnify S, there would be sufficient proof
of S's motive to execute the surety bond without the indemnity
agreement but little or no proof of X's motive for executing the
alleged contract; and 3) the meaning of the indemnity contract
should be determined from the intent of the parties, and in most
instances P's obligation to indemnify S would not be considered
by X when he executes the contract.

B. CAPACITY TO EXECUTE AN INDEMNITY CONTRACT
In determining whether a contract is or will be enforceable
the question arises whether the person or corporation has capacity
to enter into the contract. The discussion below of contract capacity is subdivided into three sections: 1) corporations; 2) agents;
and 3) other persons.
1.

Corporations

Whether a surety in this four party situation can rely on the
validity of a corporate indemnity contract depends on whether
the corporation is expressly authorized to enter into such agreements and whether the corporate agent had authority to execute
the particular contract. In absence of express corporate authority,
the contract may nevertheless be enforceable if it was impliedly
authorized because the corporate business was furthered or if the
corporation is estopped to set up lack of capacity because of benefit received. In addition, the indemnity agreement may be enforceable because the corporation is prohibited by statute from
relying on the defense of ultra vires.
a. Express corporate authority
Whether the articles of incorporation expressly provide for
corporate power to execute an indemnity contract is a question
peculiar to each particular corporation. There are no statutes
expressly granting corporations power to enter into contracts of
indemnity, but a few laws authorize corporations to enter into

P. 382 (1896); Shook v. Vanmater, 22 Wis. 532 (1868). Also see
Arnold, Indemnity Contracts and the Statute of Frauds, 9 MINN. L.
REV. 401 (1925).
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contracts of guaranty. 10 Although guaranty is easily distinguishable from indemnity," no reason exists to make the distinction
when determining the extent of corporate powers in this four
party situation; the statute should be construed to include both
powers. 12

If the corporation is authorized by statute to execute

a contract of guaranty, it should be able to do this indirectly
by executing an indemnity contract which another company relies

10 ARK. STAT. ANN. § 64-109 (1947); NEV. REV. STAT. § 78-070
(1957). Some other states have similar statutes, however, they are
subject to certain conditions; e.g., that the corporation have a direct
interest in the contract being guaranteed; GA. CODE ANN. § 22-1828
(Supp. 1958); N. Y. STOCK CORP. ACT § 19 (1951).
11 The major distinctions are set forth in an article by Arnold; Indemnity Contracts and the Statute of Frauds, 9 MINN. L. REV. 401, 414
(1925).
(a) In an indemnity contract, no debt is owed to the promisee by the third person. A contract of indemnity is an original and
independent one. A guaranty, however, presupposes a debt owing to
the promisee by a third person. (b) The indemnitor engages to save
another from loss upon some obligation he has incurred or is about
to incur on account of a third person, while a guarantor's promise is
to one to whom another is answerable. (c) The contract of indemnity is an original one to save the indemnitee harmless against future
loss or damage. The contract of guaranty is a collateral one, and
presupposes some contract or transaction to which it is secondary.
(d) The indemnitor agrees to become liable whenever the promisee
suffers loss; the guarantor's promise is to become liable conditionally
when the principal debtor defaults. (e) If the liability of the third
person is existing, and not merely in contemplation at the time the
defendant makes his promise, it cannot be an indemnity contract. It
must be one of guaranty if the obligation of the third person, for
whom the promisee becomes responsible, is pre-existing. (f) An indemnitee has no remedy on the contract against a third person. His
remedy is by direct action against the indemnitor. In the case of
guaranty, the third person for whom the promisee became responsible,
may be sued by the promisee for reimbursement, if he is damaged.
(g) Under an indemnity contract, no right of action accrues against
the indemnitor until the indemnitee suffers the loss against which
the contract protects him. The indemnitee has no rights against the
indemnitor merely because he may possibly suffer loss, but it is the
actual loss which entitles him to recovery. A guarantor however, if
it be a guaranty of payment, fixes the liability of the guarantor at
the time when the principal debtor fails to pay at maturity.
12 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 3646 (perm. ed. rev. repl.
1931): "The rule requiring a strict construction of the corporate
charter will not generally be applied where the corporation or its
members are seeking to evade a liability by giving a narrow and
restricted meaning to words ....
In such case the courts are reluctant to grant relief, and the strict construction rule does not apply.
And it should never be applied if it would defeat the evident intention of the legislature."
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on when executing the guaranty or surety contract.1" There is
certainly no basis for objection by the shareholders or creditors
because the corporate assets are not being risked in any other
manner than that consented to by the shareholders or relied on
by the creditors.
b. Implied authority
In absence of express authority the corporation may be held
liable on the theory of implied authority or equitable estoppel;
viz. the corporation had implied authority to execute the contract
because it furthered the corporate business or the corporation
cannot raise the defense of ultra vires because of a benefit re14
ceived.
In this four party situation, the corporation executing the
the indemnity contract will be receiving some benefit or furthering the corporate business in most situations. For example, a
cement company which contracts to supply cement to a contractor
executes an indemnity agreement in favor of a surety to induce
the surety to execute a necessary surety bond for the indemnitor's
customer, the contractor. This has been held to be within the
implied powers of a corporation 15 and seems to be the better holding; but the predictable outcome on a particular factual situation
which has not been decided is uncertain. 16
13 See Texas Fidelity & Bonding Co. v. General Bonding & Casualty
Ins. Co., 184 S.W. 238, rev'd, 216 S.W. 144 (Tex. Com. App. 1919).

The case was reversed on the grounds that since the statute granted

the corporation power to execute the bail bonds, the corporation could
clearly execute an indemnity agreement to another corporation which
executed the bail bonds; it would merely be doing indirectly what
it could do directly. See also, Slover, Enforceability of Guaranties
Made by Texas Corporations,10 SW. L.J. 134 (1956).
14 In those states which have not abolished the defense of ultra vires
by statute, the courts, often on the same type of factual situation
alternate between the two theories of estoppel and implied power
when they hold the corporation liable. See 6 INS. COUNSEL J. 20
(1940).
15 London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. v. Fairbanks Shovel Co., 112
Ohio St. 136, 147 N.E.2d 329 (1925).
16 For example, compare Globe Indemnity Co. v. McCullom, 313 Pa.
135, 169 Atl. 76 (1933) where a corporation executed an indemnity
agreement in favor of an indemnity company which in turn executed
a necessary bond to the contractor in favor of the creditor. The indemnitor was supplying lumber for the job to the contractor. The
court held the indemnity contract was ultra vires because there
was not a sufficient benefit accruing to the corporation which executed
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c.

Statutes abolishing the defense of ultra vires

If a corporation lacks express or implied power to execute
an indemnity contract, the contract is ultra vires, and in the
absence of legislation it is unenforceable unless public policy
prohibits the corporation from asserting the defense.Y7 Because
the law is uncertain in this area,' 8 many states have enacted
statutes limiting the ultra vires doctrine. The discussion which
follows is not all inclusive but illustrates the various ways used
by those states which have dealt with the problem.
The original Model Business Corporation Act, promulgated
by the Commission on Uniform Laws in 1928,19 changes the
ultra vires doctrine in two general aspects: 1) third persons dealing with the corporation are not charged with knowledge of the
contents of recorded articles of incorporation, 20 and 2) the act

the indemnity contract. In Timm v. Grand Rapids Brewing Co., 160
Mich. 371, 125 N.W. 357 (1910), the court held that it was not ultra
vires for a brewing corporation to execute an indemnity agreement
to a surety company which in reliance thereon executed a necessary
bond to one of the brewing companies retailers. If the corporation
for which the surety or guaranty bond is executed is the subsidiary
of the indemnitor corporation, the courts have less trouble finding
or holding the corporation liable; American Surety Co. v. 14 Canal
St. Inc., 276 Mass. 119, 176 N.E. 785 (1931).
There is no reason to distinguish between contracts of guaranty
from indemnity contracts when determining the enforceability of
such a contract executed by a corporation which did not have express authority. See Annot., 11 A.L.R. 554 (1921); Warren Creamery
Co. v. Farmers' State Bank, 81 Ind. App. 453, 143 N.E. 635 (1924).
17 When public policy will disallow a corporation from setting up ultra
vires as a defense is uncertain because of the conflicting decisions.
See FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 3478 (perm. ed. rev.
repl. 1931).
18 Stevens, A Proposal as to the Codification and Restatement of the
Ultra Vires Doctrine, 36 YALE L.J. 297 (1927).
19 THE MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT was promulgated by
the commissioners in an attempt to clear up the numerous conflicts in
the field of corporation law. The particular sections dealing with constructive notice and ultra vires followed the suggestions set forth
by Stevens in his article; note 18, supra.
20 MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 10, 9 U.L.A.: "The filing or
recording of the articles of incorporation, or amendments thereto, or
of any other papers pursuant to the provisions of this Act is required
for the purpose of affording all persons the opportunity of acquiring
knowledge of the contents thereof, but no person dealing with the
corporation shall be charged with constructive notice of the contents
of any such articles or papers by reason of such filing or recording."
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distinguishes between corporate capacity and corporate authority,
and declares a corporation shall have the capacity possessed by
natural persons. 2 1 The effect is to do away with the conception
held by some courts that an unauthorized act of a corporation
has no legal effect unless the contract is performed by both sides.
Under the act the defense of ultra vires is left to be developed
by the courts within the well settled rules of agency. For example: 1) A corporation may defend itself against a third party
who dealt with corporate agents knowing that the transaction
was ultra vires and that the agents had no authority from the
corporation to engage in the transaction; 2) A corporation may
defend itself against a third party who dealt with the corporate
agent but who was ignorant of the agent's lack of authority because of his negligence in ascertaining the facts; 3) The third
party may hold the corporation liable even though the act was
ultra vires if the act was within the apparent authority of the
agent; 4) The third party may hold the corporation liable even
though the act is ultra vires if the stockholders have authorized
or ratified either expressly or impliedly, or if they are prevented
from showing their dissent because of estoppel or laches; 5) Often
the defense of ultra vires will be allowed when it appears to be
the best method of discouraging ultra vires acts without injustice
to the parties. For example, the defense may be permitted when
both parties have knowledge that the transaction is ultra vires
and when there has been no performance on either side. 22 The

21

MODEL BUSINESS CORPORATION ACT § 11, 9 U.L.A.: "A corporation which has been formed under this Act, or a corporation which
existed at the time this Act took effect ... shall have the capacity to
act possessed by natural persons, but such a corporation shall have authority to perform only such acts as are necessary or proper to accomplish its purposes and which are not repugnant to law." In 2
La. L. Rev. 597, 607 (1940) the author states that the promulgators
of the Model Act wisely left the consequences of a ultra vires agree-

ment flexible.

The abrogation of the doctrine of limited capacity

is merely a -restatement of the law in a majority of courts
the promulgation of the Model Act, and hence this prior
be relied upon for interpretation. Thus, a fully executed
will not be disturbed, and a completely executory contract

22

prior to
law can
contract
will not

be a basis for any enforceable rights in most situations. The partly
executed ultra vires contract is still an area of uncertainty in so far
as the consequences are concerned. For criticism of these sections
of the Model Act, see Ballantine, A Critical Surety of the Illinois
Business CorporationAct, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 381 (1934).
See commissioners notes, 9 U.L.A. 149 (1957).
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§11 of the Model25 Business
states which have adopted §10 and 24
23
Indiana and Louisiana.
Corporation Act are Idaho,
A number of states have adopted the Model Business Corporation Act promulgated by the Committee on Corporate Laws of
the American Bar Association. 26 This statute completely abolishes
the ultra vires defense to both the corporation and third persons.
However, if the contract is not already performed, a stockholder
may have the performance enjoined if the court believes it to be
equitable, but any loss other than expected profit suffered by
the third persons because of the court's action may be compensated in the court's discretion.2 7 Defenses based either on the
lack of actual or apparent authority of the corporate officers to
execute the contract or of the directors to authorize the contract
have not been abrogated. There is no section abrogating the
doctrine of constructive notice or recorded articles of incorporation. If the courts in these states do not extend the defenses
based on agency any further than the question of the corporate
officers' authority to execute an indemnity contract, 28 a surety,
after obtaining a certification of the minutes of the board meeting
23
24

25
26

IDAHO CODE §§ 30-113, -114 (1948).
IND. STAT. ANN. § 25-202 (1948). Indiana has not abolished the
doctrine of constructive notice. The state has adopted the Model
Act only to the extent of providing a corporation has the capacity
possessed by natural persons.
LA. REV. STAT. tit. 12, §§ 11, 12 (1950).
ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6 (1953): "No act of a
corporation and no conveyance or transfer of real or personal property to or by a corporation shall be invalid by reason of the fact
that the corporation was without capacity or power to do such act
or to make or receive such conveyance or transfer, but such lack
of capacity or power may be asserted; (a) In a proceeding by a shareholder against the corporation to enjoin the doing of any act or acts
(c) In a proceeding by the Attorney General ....

27

.

ABA-ALI MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 6 (1953) comment: "In
abolishing the doctrine, Section 6 does not distinguish between complete lack of power and abuse of power, and does not distinguish
between express power and implied powers. Likewise, the Section
does not give regard to performance by either party, except in cases
governed by clause (a)." Clause (a) allows for compensation to
a party injured if the act is enjoined.

28

See note, 29 NW. U.L. REV. 1075 (1935). If the courts extended
the defenses based on agency to include lack of authority of the
board of directors, it would tend to bring back the uncertainty
prevalent under the ultra vires doctrine. Of course, the authorization by the board of directors of an act which they did not have
the power to authorize could be ratified by the stockholders. How-
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authorizing the execution of the indemnity contract, could be
fairly certain the indemnity contract will be enforceable. Alaska,2 9
Colorado, 30 Illinois, 3 1, Iowa, 32

Maryland, 33 North Dakota,34 Ore-

gon, 35 Virginia, 36 Wisconsin 37 and Texas 38 are among the states
which have adopted either this Model Act or a similar statute.
The corporation statutes in Michigan, 39 Minnesota 40 and Kansas completely abolish the doctrine of ultra vires in so far as
41

ever, ratification would be virtually impossible in a large corporation, but very likely in a close corporation.
In those states which have abolished both the defense of ultra
vires and the doctrine of constructive notice, it would seem a strange
anomaly to say the corporation can defend on the ground that the
directors had no actual or apparent authority. The authority comes
from the articles of incorporation, and except for persons with actual
notice of the contents of the articles, the statute abolishing the doctrine of constructive notice seemingly abolishes any constructive notice
of the limitations on the board of directors' authority. Although the
Model Act does not expressly abrogate the doctrine of constructive
notice, it seems to impliedly abolish the doctrine.
29 ALASKA COMP. LAWS ANN. § 36-2A-14 (Supp. 1958).
30 COLO. CORP. ACT § 6, Colo. Laws 1958 S.B. 14 (Eff. 1/1/59).
31 ILL. REV. STAT. c. 32, § 157.8 (1957).
32 Iowa Sess. Laws c. 321, § 6 (1959).
33 MD. ANN. CODE art. 23, § 124 (1957).
34 N.D. REV. CODE § 10-1096 (Supp. 1957).
35 ORE. REV. STAT. § 57.040 (1955).
36 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-5 (1956).
37 WIS. STAT. § 180.06 (1955).
38 TEX. BUS. CORP. ACT art. 2.04 (1956).
39 MICH. STAT. ANN. §§ 21.9, 21.11 (1937); see 34 U. DET. L.J. 297
(1956).
40 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.11 (1947): "The filing for record of articles
and certificates pursuant to sections 301.01 to 301.61 is for the purposes of affording means of acquiring knowledge of the contents
thereof, but shall not constitute constructive notice of such contents."
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 301.12 (1947): "Every corporation shall confine its acts to those authorized by the statement of purposes in the
articles of incorporation and within the limitations and restrictions
contained therein but shall have the capacity possessed by natural
persons to perform all acts within or without this state. No claim
of lack of authority based on the articles shall be asserted or be of
effect except by or on behalf of the corporation (a) against a person
having actual knowledge of such lack of authority . ..."
41

KAN. REV. STAT. art. 30, § 17-3001; art. 41, § 17-4104 (1949).
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third persons without actual knowledge are concerned. 42 It must
be remembered that in these states, as elsewhere, although the
defense of ultra vires is abrogated, there are still defenses based
on principles of agency available, such as lack of authority of
corporate officers to execute the indemnity contract.
At the present time, Nebraska limits application of the ultra
vires doctrine to the extent of raising the lack of legal organization. There are no limitations on a defense based on lack of
capacity or authority.43 However, at the present time the Nebraska Bar Association is considering whether to urge adoption
of the Model Business Corporation Act.
Due to the uncertainty of the law in many states, it would
be advisable for a surety to make certain the corporation has
express authority to execute an indemnity contract before it executes a surety bond relying on the indemnity contract.
2. Agents
The authority of an attorney or individual to execute an indemnity contract for another individual or for an officer of a
corporation to execute an indemnity contract binding on the corporation are governed by the same general rules of agency, but
are peculiar in many characteristics. For this reason, the various
types of agents will be discussed separately.
Although the courts often fail to distinguish between the
various theories upon which a principal can be held liable, the
distinctions set forth in the Restatement of Agency 44 will be adhered to in this article.
42

Even though the person dealing with the corporation has actual

43

knowledge of the lack of corporate authority to enter into the
transaction, if the contract is already performed on both sides, the
defense could not be asserted to defeat the transaction. This was
true at common law and is true after passage of the statute; note,
29 NW.U.L. REV. 1075 (1935).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-1,117 (Reissue 1954). See annotations to

44

General Corporation Law of Nebraska, 21 NEB. L. REV. 210, 262
(1942).
Restatement (Second), Agency § 8: "Apparent authority is the

power to affect the legal relations of another person by transactions with third persons, professedly as agent for the other,
arising from and in accordance with the other's manifestations
to such third persons." 8A: "Inherent agency power is a term used
in the restatement of this subject to indicate the power of an agent
which is derived not from authority, apparent authority or estoppel,
but solely from the agency relation and exists for the protection of

COMMENTS
a. Corporate Agent's Authority
A corporate agent can bind the corporation to an indemnity
contract if he is authorized by a resolution of the board of directors. 45

The corporation also can be held liable on the theory

that the corporate agent has implied authority to execute the
contract. To find implied authority two general requirements
must be fulfilled: 1) The corporate agent executing the contract
must be the general manager of the corporation, 46 and 2) execution of the contract must further the corporate business. 4 The
persons harmed by or dealing with a servant or other agent." 8B:
Estoppel: "1) A person who is not otherwise liable as a party to
a transaction purported to be done on his account, is nevertheless
subject to liability to persons who have changed their positions because of their belief that the transaction was entered into by or for
him, if (a) he intentionally or carelessly caused such belief, or (b)
knowing of such belief and that others might change their positions
because of it, he did not take reasonable steps to notify them of the
facts. 2) An owner of property who represents to third persons that
another is the owner of the property or who permits the other so to
represent, or who realizes that third persons believe that another is
the owner of the property, and that he could easily inform the third
persons of the facts, is subject to the loss of the property if the other
disposes of it to third persons who, in ignorance of the facts, purchase the property or otherwise change their position with reference
to it. 3) Change of position, as the phrase is used in the restatement
of this subject, indicates payment of money, expenditure of labor,
suffering a loss or subjection to legal liability."
45 Since apparent authority requires some manisfestation of the principal to the third person, when the principal is a corporation the
question would seldom arise. In most cases the manisfestation of
the principal, the board of directors, would be in the form of a
resolution, and hence the agent would have actual authority rather
than apparent authority.
46 In FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 665 (perm. ed. rev.
repl. 1954) a general manager is defined as: ". . . the person who
really has the most general control over the affairs of a corporation,
and who has knowledge of all its business and property, and who
can act in emergencies on his own responsibility; who may be considered the principal officer."
47 Fletcher uses
the term, "implied power"; FLETCHER, PRIVATE
CORPORATIONS § 695 (Rev. ed. 1954). The restatement uses the
term "inherent power"; Restatement (Second), Agency, § 8A.
Many courts have said that in this situation the agent has apparent authority, or that the corporation is estopped from raising
the defense because of a benefit received; Eastern Shore Brokerage
& Commission Co. v. Harrison, 141 Md. 91, 118 Atl. 192 (1922);
Advance Rumely Threasher Co. v. Evans Metcalf Implement Co.,
103 Kan. 532, 175 P. 392 (1918); M. Burg & Sons v. Twin City Four
Wheel Drive Co., 140 Minn. 101, 167 N.W. 300 (1918).
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typical situation where an indemnity agreement would be enforceable on the theory of implied authority is where the general
manager of a corporation executes an indemnity contract to enable one of its customers to secure credit. 43 Where the question
of the implied authority of an agent of a close corporation arises
liability because of
the courts generally will go further to find
49
the nature of ownership and management.
It is well settled that a corporate president, 50 secretary or
other officer who is not the general manager does not have in4S

In Woods Lumber Co. v. 'Moore, 183 Cal. 497, 191 P. 905 (1920) the
defendant corporation was engaged in the making of theatrical costumes. The articles of incorporation did not grant the corporation
power to enter into contracts of guaranty. The defendant corporation had a contract to supply costumes to X corporation for a theatrical production. X corporation needed lumber for the theatrical production but did not have sufficient credit to buy the lumber. Without authority, the president who was also the general manager authorized the secretary to execute a guaranty, guaranteeing the pay-

ment for purchase of lumber by X corporation. The court held
1) the contract was not ultra vires because it was essential to the

successful prosecution of defendant's business, and 2) the corporation was estopped from defending on the grounds of the agent's lack

of authority. The basis for the decision was that the board of
directors had clothed the agent with apparent authority to execute
the contract of guaranty which the plaintiff had relied on to his
detriment while the defendant had received a benefit. For the purposes of determining the extent of an agent's incidental authority
here there is no reason to distinguish between contracts of guaranty
and those of indemnity. There are no cases on point in Nebraska.
In Drainage Dist. No. 2 v. Dawson County Irr. Co., 140 Neb. 866,
2 N.W.2d 321 (1942) the court, in holding the president and general
manager of a corporation could bind the corporation on the basis
of authority, stated: "An act of an agent, although without actual
authority from his principal, may be with such apparent authority
as to bind the principal. Such apparent authority of the agent cannot be extended or restricted by by-laws or other instructions to
the agent by its principal, in absence of actual notice thereof." See
cases cited in Annot., 34 A.L.R.2d 290 (1954).
49 O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 8.05 (1958):
"Although the
same broad principles of corporation and agency law determine the
powers of officers in both close and publicly held corporations, the
factual differences in the patterns of operation of the two kinds of
corporations lead to wide disparities in the powers the courts actually
recognize in corporate officers. In a close corporation, ownership and
management normally coalesce; and the participants often conduct
their enterprise internally much as if it were a partnership."
50 The general rule is stated in Atlantic Refining Co. v. Ingalls & Co.,
37 Del. 503, 185 Atl. 885 (1936): "Depending somewhat on the nature
and character of the corporate business, or on whether by continued
and repeated conduct, the principles of the law of estoppel apply,
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herent or implied authority by virtue of their office to execute
an indemnity contract binding the corporation, and this is true
in Nebraska. 51
b.

Ratification

If the corporate agents execute the indemnity contract without express, implied or apparent authority, the corporation may
still incur liability on the theory of either ratification or estoppel.
It is axiomatic that in order to have the power to ratify an act,
the ratifying body must have been able to authorize the act. Hence,
assuming a corporation has power to enter into a contract of indemnity and a corporate officer executes a particular contract
without authority, either the board of directors or the stockholders
52
could ratify the contract.

there may, perhaps, be occasional cases requiring the application of
a different rule, but in most cases it is, therefore, clear that the
president of the ordinary business corporation has no implied or
presumed authority to bind it by a mere contract of guaranty, in
which it has no apparent interest." See also, Bent v. Carney, 339
Mich. 642, 64 N.W.2d 687 (1954); FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 613 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1954).
51 Nebraska adopts a strict construction of a corporate agent's implied
authority by virtue of his office, e.g., Electronic Development Co.
v. Robson, 148 Neb. 526, 28 N.W.2d 130 (1947): "As a general rule
the president of a corporation has little or no inherent power to
bind the corporation outside of a comparatively narrow circle of the
functions especially pertaining to his office."
52 FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 762, 763, 764 (perm. ed.
rev. repl. 1954). In some cases, the corporate agent may have been
authorized to execute the contract by the board of directors, where
the board of directors did not have authority to authorize the execution of the contract either because the act is ultra vires, or there
is a defect in the proceedings such as lack of a quorum. The power
of the stockholders to ratify a contract in this situation is dependent on 1) whether the state has abolished the ultra vires doctrine,
and if not, whether the state adheres to the doctrine of general capacity as distinguished from limited capacity and 2) whether the
contract is ultra vires, or merely unenforceable because of some defect in the proceedings.
In those jurisdictions which have not abolished the ultra vires
doctrine, but ahere to the doctrine of general corporate capacity, the
stockholders may by their acts either ratify the contract or be estopped
from denying its validity; Lancaster County v. Lincoln Auditorium
Ass'n., 87 Neb. 87, 122 N.W. 226 (1910). Where the jurisdiction adheres to the doctrine of dimited capacity, it has been held the contract cannot be ratified by the stockholders; People v. Wiensema State
Bank, 361 Ill. 75, 197 N.E. 537 (1935); Piedmont Feed & Grocery Co.
v. Georgia Feed & Grocery Co., 52 Ga. 847, 184 S.E. 899 (1936). Note
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In this four party situation, ratification or estoppel may appear in the form of acquiescence 53 or acceptance and retention of
the benefits. If the ratifying body has actual knowledge of the
contract5 4 a corporation cannot retain the benefits of an unauthorized contract without ratifying the contract or being estopped
from raising the lack of authorization as a defense. 55 For example,
in London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. v. Fairbanks Shovel Co.,56

that in both of these jurisdictions the law has been changed by
statute and the cases are cited as illustrations of the decisions if
the jurisdiction adheres to the doctrine of limited capacity.
If the state has abolished the doctrine of ultra vires, of if the
lack of authority is because of some defect in the proceedings
such as lack of a quorum, the stockholders can ratify the contract;
Fish v. Harrison, 87 N.J.Eq. 103, 100 Atl. 185 (1917); Mann v. Mann,
57 N.D. 550, 223 N.W. 186 (1929). The problem is governed by statute
in California. See Levin v. Martin C. Levin Inv. Co., 123 Cal. App.2d
158, 266 P.2d 553 (1954); Lebowitz, Director Misconduct and Share-

holder Ratification in Texas, 6 BAYLOR L. REV. 1 (1953).
Alexander v. Culbertson Irrigation & Water-Power Co., 61 Neb. 333,
85 N.W. 283 (1901): "A corporation having power to ratify or repudiate
a contract made in its name by a self-constituted agent, or one acting
outside of his authority should, within a reasonable time, determine
which to do, and if it does not disavow the agency and dissent from
the contract, assent and approval may well be presumed." See Be-Mac
Transport v. Michigan Express, 348 Ill. App. 460, 109 N.W.2d 370 (1952);
FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 769 (perm. ed. rev. repl.
1954).
G4 The corporation, ratifying body, must have knowledge of the transaction before their acts will amount to ratification or estoppel. In
some cases where an officer or other corporate agent which holds
a significant position in the corporation has knowledge of the ultra
vires act, if the agent is not the wrongdoer, his knowledge is imputable
to the corporation; FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS §§ 757,
759 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1954). For illustration of the principle see
London & Lancashire Indemnity Co. v. Fairbank Shovel Co., 112 Ohio
St. 136, 147 N.E. 329 (1925). However, when the corporation receives
and retains benefits from the unauthorized contract there is a presumption of ratification; FLETCHER, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§ 779 (perm. ed. rev. repl. 1954).
G On this general rule see Rich v. State Nat'l. Bank, 7 Neb. 201 (1878);
Miller v. Ortman, 235 Ind. 641, 136 N.E.2d 17 (1956); ". . .the law does
not permit a corporation to receive and retain the benefits of a
contract or transaction and at the same time repudiate liability thereunder or attempt to escape the burdens thereof on the ground that
the contract or transaction was not authorized, or that authority
therefore was not set forth in its records." See also, Alexis v. Werbell, 209 Ga. 665, 75 S.E.2d 168 (1953); Russ v. United Farm Equipment
Co., 230 La. 889, 89 So.2d 380 (1956). Usually the problem is not
whether retention of a benefit amounts to ratification or estoppel,
but whether the corporation did in fact receive'a benefit.
56 112 Ohio St. 136, 147 N.E. 329 (1925).
53
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the defendant corporation was engaged in the manufacture of
dredges. Contractor agreed to buy two dredges from the defendant corporation which they needed to fulfill a construction contract with McWilliams Brothers. Fairbanks, secretary-treasurer
of the defendant corporation, requested the plaintiff surety company to execute certain surety bonds guaranteeing the contractor's
performance on his contract with McWilliams Brothers. The surety
company agreed to execute the surety bonds if the defendant
would execute an indemnity contract agreeing to indemnify the
surety against any loss which it might suffer on the surety bonds.
Fairbanks, without any authorization from the board of directors,
executed an indemnity contract on behalf of the defendant corporation. The court held that retention of the contract benefits,
profit from the sale of the dredges, worked an equitable estoppel
against the defendant corporation. The same result should and
probably would be reached in Nebraska.5
Frequently, the corporation executing an indemnity contract
will be a close or family corporation. Because of the characteristics of a close corporation, 5s the unauthorized act by an officer
is extremely susceptable to ratification or estoppel.5 9 Although in
5T

Although there are no cases directly on point in Nebraska, the courts

follow the general rules on ratification and estoppel by acquiescence
or retention of benefits. E.g., in Citizens' Savings Trust Co. v. Independent Lumber Co., 104 Neb. 631, 178 N.W. 270 (1920) the defendant corporation owned stock in a cement company which was in need
of money. One of defendant's directors, without authority, executed
a guaranty binding the defendant to enable the cement company to
borrow money. When the corporation's president and general manager
found out about the contract they did nothing. The court held their
inaction amounted to a ratification. For a case on ratification by
retention of the benefits see Rich v. State Nat'l Bank, 7 Neb. 201 (1878).
58 O'NEAL,'CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 1.07 (1958): "A close corporation typically has the following attributes:
(1) the shareholders
are few in number, often only two or three;
(2) they usually live
in the same geographical area, know each other, and are well
acquainted with each other's business skills; (3) all or most of the
shareholders are active in the business, usually serving as directors
or officers or as key men in some managerial capacity; and (4) there
is no established market for the corporate stock, the shares not
being listed on the stock exchange or actively dealt in by brokers;
little or no trading takes place in the shares." Although close corporations have been defined in many different ways, the above
definition sets forth the important characteristics.
One man and
family corporations are merely versions of the close corporation; see
comment, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1373 (1938).
59 This is self evident when it is considered that the characteristics of
a close corporation include shareholders which are few in number
and which know each other and usually live in the same geopraphical
area.
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general the courts have not articulated any distinction between
the rules applicable to a close corporation as distinguished from
a large publicly held corporation, the actual results in the decisions
60
has been to make such a distinction.
c.

Other agents

The question of an agent's power to execute an indemnity
contract binding on his principal arises in two major situations.
First, where there is a partnership and one partner executes an
indemnity contract purporting to bind the partnership and second,
where an agent has broad express authority, such as a power of
attorney, to carry on the business affairs of his principal. In the
latter situation, there usually will be some evidence of the agent's
authority and the major question will be whether the agent has
implied authority to execute an indemnity contract on the basis
of his express authority.
A partner can be given express authority to execute an indemnity contract binding on the partnership either by the original
partnership agreement or by a subsequent agreement among a
majority of the partners if the purposes of the partnership remained unchanged.
In absence of express authority, a partner's power to execute
an indemnity contract binding on the partnership depends on
whether the execution of the contract is within the usual business of the partnership. 61 This is a question of fact for a
60

61

O'NEAL, CLOSE CORPORATIONS § 8.05 (1958): "The courts have
not articulated a difference in the rules governing officers' powers
in close and publicly held corporations; yet they appear in fact to
have often cut through the technical legal form of close corporations
to reach the results that would be reached if the enterprises were
conducted as partnerships."
"In view of the typical patterns of operation in close corporations,
holdings of this kind can usually be reconciled with traditional
doctrine by viewing an officer whose powers are in question as in
fact a general manager of the company or as having a general manager's broad powers or by applying principles of ratification or of
authority or apparent authority by acquiesence. In any event, only
in rare instances, have courts failed to hold a close corporation bound
by inter vivos contracts entered into by any officer of the corporation."
NEB. REV. STAT. § 67-309 (Reissue 1958)

"(1)

Every partner is

an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business, and the
act of ever partner, including the execution in the partnership name
of any instrument, for apparently carrying on in the ususal way the
business of the partnership of which he is a member binds the partnership, unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority to act
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jury.0 2- It has been stated that the execution of a contract of indemnity is generally not within the ordinary course of business for
a partnership and that a partner does not have implied power to
bind the partnership.6 3 However, the contract has been held binding on the partnership where the partnership has executed an indemnity contract in previous dealings with the same parties or
where the partnership receives a benefit furthering its business.6 4
Where agents other than corporate agents or partners are
concerned, the question usually will be one of interpretation of
the authority manifested by the principal.65 It is generally held
there must be specific express authorization to grant the agent
power to bind the principal to an indemnity contract. An instrument such as a power of attorney which grants the agent general
powers such as power to manage a business, will not confer upon
the agent the implied power to bind the principal to a contract
of indemnity. 66 In Bullard v. De Groff,6 7 the agent was the genfor the partnership in the particular matter, and the person with whom
he is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has not such authority.
(2) An act of a partner which is not apparently for the carrying
on of the business of the partnership in the usual way does not
bind the partnership unless authorized by the other partners." This
is section 9 of the UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT which has been
adopted in the following states: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Deleware, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusettes, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, Nevada,
New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon,
Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin.
The UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT is a codification of the common
law.
62 Brocater v. Serio, 173 Md. 374, 196 Atl. 125 (1938); Nicolai-Nerrach Co.
v. Abrams, 116 Ore. 424, 240 P. 870 (1925).
63 See Woodruff v. Lillis, 174 Miss. 91, 164 So. 225 (1935); CRANE,
PARTNERSHIP § 51 (1952).
64 See Wolff v. First Nat'l. Bank, 47 Ariz. 97, 53 P.2d 1077 (1936); CRANE,
PARTNERSHIP § 51 (1952).
The court's discussion in Bullard v.
De Groff, 59 Neb. 783, 82 N.W. 4 (1900) although not dealing with
a partnership, is applicable, since a partner is merely an agent.
65 It is doubtful that a surety company would rely on the mere representation by a person that he has authority to bind another to an
indemnity contract. There would usually be some evidence of the
principal's manifestation from which could be inferred that the
agent has authority to execute the indemnity contract.
66 Formal instruments such as power of attorney are strictly construed;
Burns v. Commonwealth Trailer Sales, 163 Neb. 308, 79 N.W.2d 563
(1956): "Indeed, according to the established rule, powers of attorney
will be given a narrow and restricted construction, and will be held
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eral manager of a partnership engaged in the lumber business.
Without express authority, he executed a performance bond for
a contractor in the name of the partnership. In holding the agent
did not have implied authority to bind the partnership, even
though the partnership would possibly furnish the lumber for
the contract, the Nebraska Supreme Court stated:
An agent in charge of a retail lumber business, with the
power and authority ordinarily incident to the conduct of such
business, exceeds the scope of his agency in signing his principal's
name to an obligation for the faithful performance by a third
party of a contract for the construction of a building, or an obligation of like character. 68

If the principal manifests to the surety that the agent has
authority to execute an indemnity contract, for example, if the
surety calls up the principal and the principal tells the surety
the agent has authority to execute the contract, the principal is
liable on the indemnity contract because of the agent's apparent
9
authority regardless of whether the agent had actual authority.
If the agent executing the indemnity contract did not have
authority to bind the principal, the principal may become bound
to grant only those powers which are expressly specificed and
such others as are essential to carry into effect the expressed powers."
See also Gramam Ice Cream Co. v. Petros, 127 Neb. 172, 254 N.W.
869 (1934); Bergman v. Dykhouse, 316 Mich. 315, 25 N.W.2d 210 (1946);
Von Wedel v. Clark, 84 F. Supp. 299 (1949) and Thompson v. Evans,
256 Ala. 383, 54 So.2d 774 (1951) where the agent was authorized
to sign the principal's name to appeal bonds. The court held the
agent was not authorized to sign the principal's name to criminal
bail bonds. The general rule of construction is contrary to the one
advocated by the Restatement (Second) Agency, § 34, comment
h: ".

.

. they are construed so as to carry out the intent of the

principle. There should be neither a strict nor a liberal interpretation, but a fair construction which carries out the intent as expressed. It is true that dangerous powers, such as the power to borrow
money, will not be inferred unless' it is reasonably clear that this
was intended." It is probable that the power to execute an indemnity
contract binding the principal is a dangerous power and will not
be inferred; Hearst Publishing Co. v. Litsky, 339 Mich. 642, 64 N.W.2d
687 (1954): "Authority to bind the principal by a contract of guaranty
or suretyship is not ordinarily to be implied from the existancy
of a general agency." In determining the powers of the agent there
is little reason to distinguish between a contract of indemnity and
one of suretyship.
67 59 Neb. 783, 82 N.W. 4 (1900).
0s Id. at 788, 82 N.W. at 5.
09 Restatement (Second), Agency § 8. For an example of how
Nebraska uses the term "apparent authority" see Oleson v. Albers,
130 Neb. 823, 266 N.W. 632 (1936).
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on the theories of ratification or estoppel. Generally, a contract
is ratified when there is:
(a) a manifestation of an election by one on whose account
an unauthorized act has been done to treat the act as authorized,
by him justifiable only if there were such an
or (b) conduct
0
election.7
There is an estoppel when:
(1) A person who is not otherwise liable as a party to a
transaction purported to be done on his account, is nevertheless
subject to liability to persons who have changed their positions
because of their belief that the transaction was entered into by
or for him, if (a) he intentionally or carelessly caused such belief, or (b) knowing of such belief and that others might change
their positions because of it, he did not take reasonable steps to
notify them of the facts.71
The many varied situations in which ratification
or estoppel can
2
arise are beyond the scope of this paper.7
d. Suggested procedure
If the indemnitor is a corporation, the indemnitee should
1) make certain the articles of incorporation expressly grant the
corporation authority to enter into an indemnity contract and
2) have the corporation provide a properly certified copy of the
minutes of the board of directors meeting in which the agent
was authorized to execute the specific indemnity contract.
If the indemnitor is a partnership, the indemnitee should either
have all of the partners sign the indemnity contract or have the
partner executing the contract provide a letter in which all of
the partners authorize and consent to the execution of the contract binding the partnership.
If the indemnitor is an individual, the indemnitee should
secure a copy of written express authority for the agent to execute

70

71
72

Restatement (Second), Agency § 8A.
Restatement (Second), Agency § 8B.
For example, in Singer Sewing Machine Co. v. Barger, 92 Neb. 539,
138 N.W. 741 (1912) the court stated; "A principal must disaffirm
the unauthorized act of his agent within a reasonable time after such
act comes to his knowledge, or he will be bound thereby." In Furrer
v. Nebraska Building & Inv. Co., 111 Neb. 423, 196 N.W. 680 (1923)
the court stated; "The rule is well settled that a principal cannot
knowingly retain the benefits accruing from the unauthorized act
of his agent and escape legal obligations, assumed by the agent in the
name of the principal, from which the benefits accrue."
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the indemnity contract, or, secure a letter from the principal
stating the agent has authority to bind the principal to this contract of indemnity.
3.

Capacity of persons other than corporate agents and partners

When an individual, other than an agent or a partner, executes an indemnity contract, questions relating to individual contract capacity arise; for example, the capacity of a married woman
or of a minor to enter into an enforceable contract; or the capacity
of either spouse to individually bind community property in those
states which have adopted community property acts.
The common law restriction on a married woman's capacity
to contract has been abrogated to various degrees by statute in
most states.7 3 In those states which have granted the married
woman the capacity to contract as if she were unmarried, an indemnity contract executed by her would be enforceable against
her separate estate.
The statutes of Nebraska, as now amended, state:
A married woman may bargain, sell, and convey her real and
personal property. Such a woman may enter into any contract
in the same manner, to the same extent, and with like effect as
a married man. The obligations
of her contracts shall be the
74
same as a married man.
Although there has been no case decided under the statute the
legislative intent was to abrogate judicial refinements and restrictions found to exist in the previous statute.7 5 Assuming this to
73

For example, indemnity contracts executed by married women would
be of probable validity in the following states: COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 90-2-10 (1953); IOWA CODE ANN. § 597.18 (1950); KAN. GEN.
STAT. § 23-202 (1949); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 519.01 (1947); MO.
STAT. ANN. § 451.290 (1952); OHIO REV. CODE § 3103.05 (1953);
ORE. REV. STAT. § 108.010 (1957); SO. DAK. CODE § 14.0207 (1939);

TEX. CIV. STAT. art. 4614 (Supp. 1958) if she elected to have sole
management; WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 6.015, 246.03 (1957); WYO. COMP.
STAT. §§ 50-201, 202 (1946). In KY. REV. STAT. § 404.010 (1955)

the husband must be joined in the instrument. Also in NEV. REV.
STAT. § 124.010 (1957).
74

NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-202 (Supp. 1957).

75

The previous section stated: "A married woman, while the marriage
relation subsists, may bargain, sell and convey her real and personal
property, and enter into any contract with reference to the same in
the same manner, to the same extent, and with like effect as a
married man may in relation to his real and personal property."
Under this statute, in the situation which this paper is about, where
the consideration moves to a third party other than the wife, the
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be so, a married woman could execute an indemnity contract binding her present estate and possibly her future estate.
7
In those states which have adopted community property acts, 6
difficult questions arise concerning the definition of community
property and whether one spouse can bind community property
by the execution of an indemnity contract. A discussion of these
problems is beyond the scope of this paper. 77 It is suggested however that in those states the indemnitee secure the signature of
both husband and wife on the indemnity contract.
If the indemnity contract is executed by a minor, insane or
intoxicated person, the more common view is that the contract
is voidable at the option of the indemnitor. 7 In a majority of
jurisdictions, an infant's misrepresentation as to his age will not
estop him from raising his lack of capacity as a defense, 79 although
indemnity contract in order to be binding, had to be made upon

76

77

78

79

the faith of the separate estate of the married woman, and the
burden of proof was on the party attempting to hold her liable; State
Nat'l. Bank v. Smith, 55 Neb. 54, 75 N.W. 51 (1898). However, if
the indemnity contract contained wording to the effect; "I or we,
each of us, personally hereby charge our separate and individual estate
with payment", the wife would be estopped from setting up evidence
to the effect that she did not intend to bind her separate estate;
Sturn v. Lloyd, 30 Neb. 89, 264 N.W. 150 (1936). But see Fidelity &
Deposit Co. v. Lapidus, 136 Neb. 473, 286 N.W. 386 (1939) where the
court held a covenant did not estop the wife. It was held that the
contract would not bind the future estate of the married woman, but
merely the present estate because she could not contract with reference
to her future estate; Kocher v. Cornell, 59 Neb. 315, 80 N.W. 911
(1899). See an excellent article on the subject; Ginsburg, Contractual
Liability of Married Women in Nebraska, 20 NEB. L. REV. 191 (1941).
The following states have adopted community property acts; Arizona,
California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and
Washington.
For an excellent discussion of the community property law in those
states which have enacted community property laws, see Community
Property Symposium, 15 LA. L. REV. 512 (1955).
Although some of the older cases have made the statement that if
the contract executed by a minor is prejudicial, such as a surety
contract, it is void as distinguished from voidable; Chandler v. McKinney, 6 Mich. 216 (1859); Green v. Wilding, 59 Iowa 679, 13 N.W.
761 (1882), the better, and more recent view is that such contracts
are merely voidable, and can be ratified upon reaching majority;
Pierce Co. v. Wallace, 251 Mass. 383, 146 N.E. 658 (1925). The same
rule is applicable to insane and intoxicated persons; De Vries v.
Crofoot, 148 Mich. 183, 111 N.W. 775 (1907); Carpenter v. Rogers,
61 Mich. 384, 28 N.W.156 (1886).
See WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 235 (1936).
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a minority of states, some of which have enacted statutes, disallow such a defense.80
C.

CONSIDERATION

Consideration sufficient for an indemnity contract does not
differ from consideration necessary to support any contract. The
Restatement of Contracts defines consideration as:
(a) an act other than a promise, or (b) a forbearance, or
(c) the creation, modification or destruction of a legal relation,
or (d) a return promise, bargained for and given in exchange for
the promise. (2) Consideration may be given to the promisor
or to some other person. It may be given by the promisee or by
some other person. 8 1

If for example, the indemnitor is engaged in the lumber business,
and executes the indemnity contract in reliance upon a promise
by the contractor to buy lumber from him, the consideration for
the indemnity contract is the bargained for promise of the contractor to buy lumber from the indemnitor.
In the more common situation, the consideration for the indemnity contract is the execution of the surety bond; i.e. the consideration for the promise to indemnify the surety company is
the bargained for act of the surety company to execute the surety
bond. It is in this situation, when the indemnity contract is executed subsequent to the execution of the surety bond, which presents the majority of problems concerning the sufficiency of consideration for an indemnity contract.8 2 The cases can be divided
into three main factual situations.
When the indemnity contract is executed subsequent to the

execution of the surety bond, without any prior agreement by
the contractor to secure an indemnitor, the indemnity contract
is unenforceable because of lack of consideration.8 3

The general

80 E.g. IOWA CODE ANN. § 559.3

(1950): "No contract can be thus
disaffirmed in cases where, on account of the minor's own misrepre-

sentations as to his majority, or from his having engaged in business

as an adult, the other party had good reason to believe him capable
of contracting." Also see UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 15, ch. 2, § 3 (1953);
WASH. REV. CODE tit. 26, ch. 28, § 070 (1956); see notes 16 U.
CHI. L. REV. 183 (1948), 6 FORDHAM L. REV. 126 (1937).

81 Restatement, Contracts § 75.
82 See Lack of Consideration-TheIndemnitor's Defense, 25 Ins. Counsel
J. 294 (1958).
83 See Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Black, 39 N.Y.S.2d 778,
265 App. Div. 524 (1943); Davies County Bank & Trust Co. v. Wright,
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84
rule is stated in Thompson v. Moe:

In the case now before us, the bond, as stated, was not supported by the original consideration for the contract . . .because
it was something that arose subsequently and was not in contemplation of the parties at that time. It was necessary that it be
supported by an independent consideration.85
There is no consideration for the indemnity contract in this situation because the alleged consideration, the execution of the surety
bond, was not bargained for as the bond was executed before the
indemnitor was asked to execute the indemnity contract. If the
indemnity contract is erroneously dated prior to the execution
of the surety bond, the parol evidence rule will not prevent the
indemnitor from showing lack of consideration on the grounds
that the indemnity contract was in fact executed subsequent to
the execution of the surety bond.8 6
In the second situation, the prospective indemnitor notifies
the surety prior to the execution of the surety bond that he will
execute the indemnity agreement. Here, there is consideration for
the indemnity contract even though it is executed subsequent to
the execution of the surety bond.8 7 For example, in Title Guaranty & Surety Co. v. Packard-Spink Co.8 8 the court stated:
It is not necessary to its validity that a written agreement to
indemnify against liability under a contract be executed simulta-

84

129 Ky. 21, 110 S.W. 361 (1908); Rusk v. Johnston, 19 Cal. App.2d
408, 63 P.2d 1167 (1937); Greenwold Grift Co. v. Durham, 191 Ga.
586, 13 S.E.2d 346 (1923); First Nat'l. Bank v. Gibbs, 84 Ind. App.
491, 141 N.E. 265 (1923); Gloucester Mut. Fishing Ins. Co. v. Boyer,
294 Mass. 35, 200 N.E. 557 (1936); Tri-State Lumber & Shingle Co.
v. Proctor, 233 Mo. App. 1207, 128 S.W.2d 1116 (1939); Kosson & Sons
v. Harris, 108 N.J.L. 162, 154 Al. 726 (1931); Van Beeber v. Vechill,
166 Ore. 10, 109 P.2d 1046 (1941); Harr v. Perkins, 335 Pa. 186, 6
A.2d 534 (1939); dissent in Cowles Pub. Co. v. McMann, 25 Wash.2d
726, 172 P.2d 235 (1946).
147 Wash. 133, 265 P. 457 (1928).

85 Id. 265 P. at 457.
86

Restatement, Contracts § 238, Comment b.

87

See Cook v. Parker, 22 Cal. App.2d 539, 71 P.2d 591 (1937); Allison
v. Sumner, 210 Ill. App. 25 (1918); Robertson v. Rowell, 158 Mass. 94,
32 N.E. 898 (1893); Eitel v. Farr, 178 Mo. App. 367, 165 S.W. 1191
(1914); Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Master Laboratories, 143 Neb.
617, 10 N.W.2d 501 (1943); Burt v. Gage, 50 S.D. 208, 208 N.W. 985
(1926); Williamson & Co. v. Ragsdale, 170 Tenn. 439, 95 S.W.2d 922
(1936).
75 Wash. 178, 134 P. 812 (1913).

88
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neously with the contract indemnified. It is enough that it be
executed in compliance with the agreement whether at the time
of the agreement or thereafter.S9

In the third situation, the contractor gives his word that a
certain named person will indemnify the surety, but that person
is ignorant that his name has been given as an indemnitor. The
surety company issues the bond and subsequently receives the.
indemnity contract executed by the named person. In this situation, the indemnitor can argue the alleged consideration for his
indemnity contract, the execution of the surety bond, was not
bargained for, and cannot therefore be considered for the indemnity contract. However, the cases hold otherwise. 90 The basis
for the decisions is that since the contractor agreed to secure a
certain person to execute an indemnity contract, that person in
signing in fact carried out that agreement and must be conclusively
presumed to have so intended when he signed. 9 1
Although not supported or discussed by authority, it can be
argued for the surety that the execution of the indemnity contract by the indemnitor was a novation. The Restatement of Contracts defines a novation as:
...

a contract that (a) discharges immediately a previous

contractual duty or a duty to make compensation, and (b) creates
a new contractual duty, and (c) includes as a party one who nei-92
ther owed the previous duty nor was entitled to its performance.
The contractor had a duty to supply an indemnitor for the surety
and the new liability of the indemnitor, a third party who owed
no previous duty and was entitled to no previous performance,
replaced the duty of the contractor to secure the indemnitor.
D.

CONSTRUCTION OF THE INDEMNITY CONTRACT

The rules of construction applicable to any contract are equally
applicable to indemnity contracts. Hence, the important factor is
to determine the intention of the parties by considering the wording of the contract, the situation and circumstances surrounding

89 Id. at 180, 134 P. at 813.
00 See Loveland v. Sigel-Companion Livestock Co., 77 Colo. 22, 234 P.

168 (1925); Bowen v. Thwing, 56 Minn. 177, 57 N.W. 468 (1894);
Devitt v. Foster, 159 Miss. 687, 132 So. 182 (1931); dissent in Cowles
Pub. Co. v. McMann, 25 Wash. 2d 726, 172 P.2d 235 (1946).
91 Bowen v. Thwing, 56 Minn. 177, 57 N.W. 468 (1894).
02

Restatement, Contracts § 424.
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the formation of the contract and known customs of the trade.93
In most jurisdictions, if the indemnity contract is capable of more
than one interpretation, it will be strictly construed against the
surety company on the policy that the surety company prepared
the form and hence is responsible for any ambiguity 94 or that
the indemnitor entered into the obligation without pecuniary
compensation.9" The contract will not be construed to enlarge upon the indemnitor's liability beyond that expressly provided for
in the indemnity contract.
If the contract is ambiguous as to whether it indemnifies
against loss as distinguished from liability, the courts tend to
construe it to indemnify against loss.96
E. PuBLIC POLICY
Public policy affecting the validity of an indemnity contract
in this four party situation would arise only when the persons
executing the indemnity contract are the persons whom a statute
intended to protect by requiring the surety bond. The issue presented is whether the statutory required protection was meant
to protect the general public and therefore incapable of being
waived by an indemnity contract. 97 In the analogous cases found,
the courts hold the indemnity contract is valid and does not con98
travene public policy

For a general statement of the applicable rules of construction see
First Trust Co. v. Airedale Ranch & Cattle Co., 136 Neb. 521, 286
N.W. 766 (1939). Also see Chideckel v. Dime Savings Bank, 103
N.Y.S.2d 616 (1951); Moriarty v. Tomlinson, 58 S.D. 431, 235 N.W.
363 (1931).
94 Royal Indemnity Co. v. Gray, 289 II. App. 367, 7 N.E.2d 353 (1937).
95 See Kramer v. Linz, 73 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); Mfg. &
93

Merchants Building & Loan Ass'n. v. Wlley, 321 Pa. 340, 183 Atl.

96

97

98

789 (1936); Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v. Paulk, 180 F.2d
79 (5th Cir. 1950); Barratt v. Greenfield, 137 Pa. Super. 310, 9 A.2d
188 (1939). Contra, Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Thieme, 193 So. 496
(1940).
See Lyle v. McCormich Harvesting Co., 108 Wis. 81, 84 N.W. 18 (1900);
Stuart v. Carter, 79 W.Va. 92, 90 S.E. 537 (1916); State v. Mills, 23
N.M. 549, 169 P. 1171 (1917).
See Annot., 154 A.L.R. 838 (1945).
E.g., Allen v. Commercial Casualty Ins. Co., 131 N.J.L. 475, 37 A.2d
37 (1944); Nat'l. Auto Ins. v. Winter, 58 Cal. App.2d 11, 136 P.2d 22

(1943).
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III. THE INDEMNITOR'S LIABILITY
The circumstances affecting the accrual and extent of the indemnitor's liability will be discussed in this section. Those matters which will completely discharge the indemnitor are discussed
in a subsequent section.
A. EXTENT

OF LiABILITY

There are many things which will affect the amount of the
indemnitor's liability. For example, acts by the surety which
prejudice the indemnitor may reduce the amount which the indemnitor is required to pay the surety; the amount recovered by
the creditor in a judgment against the surety may be conclusive
as against the indemnitor. Although some of the factors discussed
do not vary the amount recoverable, they do affect the ultimate
recovery against the indemnitor.
1. Judgment against surety as conclusive evidence of amount
Whether a judgment against a surety on a bond is conclusive
as to the determination and extent of the indemnitor's liability
is dependent on 1) whether the indemnitor predicated his liability
on litigation, and if not, 2) whether the surety notified the indemnitor of the pending action and gave the indemnitor a chance
to defend.
The indemnity contract, in order to make the indemnitor's
liability conclusively dependent on a judgment against the surety,
must expressly so provide, 99 and a general provision that the indemnitor will indemnify the surety against any loss incurred because of the execution of the surety bond will not make such
judgments conclusive.
99 For example, In United States Fidelity & Guaranty v. Jones, 87 F.2d
346 (5th Cir. 1937) the bond contained the following provision:
"...the vouchers or other evidence of payments made by the company under its obligation of suretyship shall be conclusive evidence
of the fact and extent of the liability of the undersigned to said
company under said obligation... whether said payments were...
incurred in investigation of a claim made thereon, adjusting a loss
or claim in connection therewith... and whether voluntarily made or
paid after suit and judgment." A payment under this contract was
conclusive against the indemnitor. In Halstead Lumber Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., 38 Ariz. 228, 298 P. 925 (1931) the
court construed a similar contract provision and stated; "If the
money was actually paid, the only way in which it can be attacked
by the indemnitor is through a plea and proof of bad faith in the
payment."
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In absence of an express provision in the indemnity contract,
judgments against the surety are not conclusive against the indemnitor unless he was notified of the pending action and given
a chance to defend, or the defense which the indemnitor is attempting to raise was necessarily decided in the prior action. For
example, in United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Paulk,0 0°
a surety executed a payment bond for a contractor on a construction job relying on an indemnity agreement executed to the surety
by a third person. Without the knowledge of the surety or the
indemnitor, the contractor and creditor materially altered the
construction contract. After completion of the altered contract
the creditor filed suit against the contractor and surety for unpaid
labor and material accounts. The surety failed to give the indemnitor notice of the action. The surety did not raise the defense of material alteration of contract and judgment was entered
against the surety. The surety then brought action against the
indemnitor for the amount of the prior judgment against the surety.
The indemnitor alleged the surety had a good defense in the prior
action; i.e. material alteration of the construction contract without the consent of the surety. The court held for the indemnitor,
stating:
...according to the weight of authority, as a general rule,
where the indemnitor has not been notified of the prior suit and
has not made his liability over depend expressly on the event of
a litigation to which he was not a party and has not stipulated
to abide by the judgment of the suit, estoppel is not created by
the judgment therein and such judgment does not become conclusive evidence of the ultimate liability over to the defendant
therein. It is regarded as prima facie evidence of the fact of its
rendition and the amount of damages.' 0 '
In a Nebraska case, National Surety Co. v. Love, 0 2 the court
in holding the indemnitor could not defend on the grounds that
the surety had a good defense in the prior action when the surety
had raised that defense and the issue had been decided, stated:
From the general tenor of the authorities bearing upon this
question we are inclined to the view that the judgment, though
rendered without notice to the indemnitor, was conclusive as to
the facts necessarily taken into consideration by the Oregon
court in arriving at the judgment, where it appears that the defense sought to be interposed by the indemnitor to show his nonliability upon the cause of action on which the judgment was
based, had in good faith been presented by the indenuitee in the
100 15 S.W.2d 100 (Tex. Civ. App. 1929).
OILId. 15 S.W.2d at 103.
105 Neb. 855, 182 N.W. 490 (1921).
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action wherein the10 3judgment rendered, and there is no plea of
fraud or collusion.
If the surety had notified and given the indemnitor a chance
to defend the pending action, the judgment would be conclusive
against the indemnitor even though the surety had not raised
good defenses available in the prior action:
Unless an express contract of indemnity provides otherwise,
it is not necessary, in order to maintain an action against an
indemnitor to recover for a liability which has been determined
in a prior action against the indemnitee, that the indemnitor
should have been notified of the suit against the indemnitee. But
unless notice is given the first judgment is prima facie evidence
had
only of liability and the indemnitor may show
10 4the indemnitee
a good defense which he neglected to set up.
Hence, where the indemnity contract has no provision making the indemnitor's liability dependent on a judgment against the
surety, 1) if the surety notified and gave the indemnitor a chance
to defend the pending action, .a judgment against the surety is
conclusive as to existence and extent against the indemnitor, or
2) if the surety did not notify the indemnitor, in Nebraska the
judgment is conclusive as to matters necessarily decided in the
prior action.' 5 If neither of the above apply, then the judgment
is merely prima facie evidence of the indemnitor's liability, and
the surety can recover only the loss and damage proved. 10 6
2.

Whether contract is a continuing one?

If the indemnity contract does not expressly cover subsequent
bonds executed by the surety for the same principal, the question
is whether from the wording of the contract and surrounding circumstances the parties intended this to be a continuing indemnity
contract. Illustrating some of the surrounding circumstances pertistatement in Employers' Lianent in resolving the question is 0the
7
bility Assurance Corp. v. Tebbs:
Reading the indemnity bond in its entirety and particularly

those words 'and other obligees' and taking into consideration all
the evidence, facts and circumstances, including the poor financial
rating of the defendant.., at the time the indemnity bond was
103 Id. 862, 182 N.W. at 492. But see note 105, infra.
104 op. cit. supra 859, 182 N.W. at 492.

105 See notes, 12 IOWA L. REV. 426 (1927); 18 VA. L. REV. 556 (1932);
Restatement, Judgments § 107(a).
100 Kramer v. Linz, 73 S.W.2d 648 Tex. Civ. App. 1934).
107 137 F. Supp. 869 (D. Wyo. 1956).
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executed and also the fact that his financial condition had not
been enhanced by the first contract, together with his request
for a second bond without making any suggestion as to further
indemnity, I am inclined to believe that it was the intention of
the parties at the time the indemnity bond was executed that it
was to be considered as a continuing bond for the protection of
the plaintiff in any future contract bonds which it might issue on
behalf of the defendant...

os

In absence of a provision in a continuing contract, it will remain
in force a reasonable time. 10 9
3. Surety's duty to minimize indemnitor's damages
The surety has a duty to take reasonable precautions to minimize the indemnitor's loss. If greater damage is caused by a
surety's failure to take reasonable precautions, the amount by
which the damages were increased are not recoverable from the
indemnitor. 110 For example, in Columbia Casualty Co. v. Tibma,11
the Highway Improvement Company entered into a contract with
the State Highway Commission for the construction of a road.
The company subcontracted part of the work out to Barcus, requiring the subcontractor to provide a performance bond. The
surety company executed the performance bond relying on an
indemnity contract executed by a third party. Prior to October 1,
1925, the principal contractor notified surety that Barcus's manner
of work was not satisfactory and there might be liability under
the bond. Shortly thereafter, surety's agents inspected the work
for the first time and reported to the indemnitor's attorney that
Barcus was getting along as well as could be expected and they
were sure the contract would work itself out without liability to
anyone. The indemnitor's attorney notified surety that Barcus
was not qualified to handle the job and would have to be watched.
On April 22, 1926, indemnitor's attorney discovered the principal
contractor had done a considerable amount of Barcus's work at
exorbitant prices and was threatening to take over the entire con08 Id. at 871.
109 Employers Liability Assurance Corp. v. Tebbs, 137 F. Supp. 869 (D.

Wyo. 1956).

110 See Calamita v. De Ponte, 122 Conn. 20, 187 Atl. 129 (1936); Northern
Welding Co. v. Jordan, 150 Ain. 12, 184 N.W. 39 (1921) where the
court stated the general rule: "It was the duty of the corporation
to use reasonable care and diligence to minimize its damages. No
particular course can be mapped out as the proper one unless it can
be shown that such course would be the only one which a reasonably prudent and diligent person would pursue."
111 63 F.2d 538 (7th Cir. 1933).
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tract. Informing the surety of these facts he requested a responsible man take over the job, and denied any liability on the indemnity contract because the surety had failed to take any steps
to minimize the indemnitor's liability. The surety had the job
completed and sued the indemnitor. The court, in denying full
recovery, stated:
...the law imposed upon appellant the duty, when it learned
of default or threatened default under its bond, to exercise diligence to keep the loss as low as possible, and that it could not
stand idly by and permit loss to accrue and mount and then collect in full from the indemnitor.112
4. Surety's right to settle claims
If the indemnitor provides in the indemnity contract that the
indemnitee has authority to settle any suits brought against it
on the suretyship obligation the indemnitor can attack a settlement only on the basis of fraud. For example, in Halstead Lumber Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co.,113 the court construed the following contract provision:
That in any accounting which may be had between the Undersigned and the Surety, the Surety shall be entitled to charge for
any and all disbursements and about the matters herein contemplated made by it in good faith, under the belief that it is or was
liable for the sum and amounts so disbursed, or that it was necessary or expedient to make such disbursements, whether or not
such liability, necessity, or expediency existed.
On the basis of this provision the court stated: "If the money
was actually paid, the only way in which it can be attacked by
the indemnitor is through a plea and proof of bad faith in payment ,,114

Where there is no specific provision allowing the indemnitee
to settle claims against it, the indemnitee has a right to settle
the claim in good faith if the indemnitor after notification of the
pending action refuses to defend and denounces all liability.1 5
In Chicago R.R. v. Dobry Flour Mills,116 the court stated:
where the indemnitor denies liability under the indemnity contract and refuses to assume the defense of the claim then
Id. at 541.
38 Ariz. 228, 298 P. 925 (1931).
114 Id. 298 P. at 928.
115 See authority cited in Chicago R.R. v. Dobry Flour Mills, 211 F.2d
785, 788 (10th Cir. 1954).
112
113

116 211 F.2d 785 (10th Cir. 1954).
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the indemnitee is in full charge of the matter and may make a
good faith settlement without assuming the risk of being able to
prove absolute legal liability or the actual amount of the damage.
A contrary rule would make the right to settle
meaningless in
117
cases where the indemnitor has denied liability.
5.

Indemnitor's liability for attorney fees and costs

Where reasonable attorney fees are incurred in an action seeking indemnification, the law implies a right to recover them plus
costs.11s When an action is brought by the surety to recover attorney fees incurred in a prior action against the surety, in absence of specific provision in the indemnity contract, the courts
generally construe the contract to include reasonable attorney
fees if they are not unnecessarily incurred." 9 However, in Queen
City Coach Co. v. Lumberton Coach Co., 1 20 the court held an
agreement to indemnify against any loss occasioned by the operation of motor vehicles over a franchise route did not cover attorney fees incurred in a successful defense. Whether notice to
the indemnitor of the pending action against the surety is a pre121
requisite to recovering attorney fees is uncertain.

B. ACCRUAL or LiABsrry
To determine the question of when liability accrues, indemnity
contracts are generally divided into two classifications: 122 1) in-

Id. 788.
118 See Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co. v. Cassanassa, 301 Mass. 246,
16 N.E.2d 860 (1938); Sigmond Rothchild Co. v. Moore, 166 S.W.2d
744 (Tex. Civ. App. 1942); Pure Oil Co. v. Goetechnical Corp., 129
F. Supp. 194 (E.D. La. 1955); must be a reasonable amount, Girard
Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Koenigsberg, 65 S.W.2d 783 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1933).
119 For example, United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Garrett, 156
S.C. 132, 152 S.E. 772 (1930).
120 229 N.C. 534, 50 S.E.2d 288 (1948).
121 Compare dictum in United States Fidelity & Guaranty v. Garrett,
156 S.C. 132, 152 S.E. 772 (1930): "Conceding the rule to be that
an indernitee who is sued on a claim covered by an indemnity agreement may not recover from the indemnitor the attorney's fees paid
by him in defending the suit, unless he has notified the indemnitor
to defend against the claim and the indemnitor has refused . .. "
with United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Paulk, 15 S.W.2d 100
(Tex. Civ. App. 1929), where the court went' on the basis of collateral estoppel and fact that the indemnitor had made his liability
dependent on litigation.
122 In Alberts v. American Casualty Co., 88 Cal.App.2d 891, 200 P.2d 37
(Cal. App. 1948) the court distinguished between the two types of
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demnity against liability and 2) indemnity against loss or damage.
The classification which a particular contract falls within is dependent on the wording. If the contract is ambiguous or not
clear as to which classification it should come within, the courts
tend to construe it to be a contract of indemnity against loss. 123
1. Indemnity against liability
When the indemnitor agrees to indemnify the indemnitee
(surety) against "claims or demands"; "before the indemnitee
shall be compelled to pay the same"; or "when the indemnitee
becomes liable" or similar wording, it is an agreement to indemnify
against liability. On this type of indemnity contract, the indemnitee's cause of action accrues when the liability of the indemnitee
becomes fixed, 124 in absence of a provision in the contract that
the indemnitee's liability is fixed when demand is made on the
indemnitee. 125 It is at this time the statute of limitations begins
126
to run.
2.

Indemnity against loss or damage
If

the contract is one of indemnity against loss, an action

against the indemnitor does not arise until the indemnitee suffers
indemnity contracts: "There are two classes of contracts of indemnity.
In one class the indemnitor engages to save the indemnitee from
loss, meaning actual loss. In the other class the indemnitor engages
to save the indemnitee from liability. In the first class the indemnitee
must prove loss actually suffered by him ......
In the second class
the indemnitee need not prove actual loss but only that he has become liable. The indemnitee may, without having paid anything,
recover from the indemnitor as soon as liability is legally imposed."
See also Ramey v. Hopkins, 138 Cal. App. 685, 33 P.2d 443 (1934).
123 Solary v. Webster, 35 Fla. 363, 17 So. 646 (1895); Valentine v. Wheeler,
122 Mass. 566, 23 Am. Rep. 404 (1876); Miller v. Fries, 66 N.J.L.
377, 49 Atl. 674 (1901).
124 In Alberts v. American Casualty Co., 88 Cal. App.2d 891, 200 P.2d 37
(1948) the court stated: "Liability is established upon the rendition
of a judgment against the indemnitee with respect to the thing indemnified although the judgment remains unpaid."
125 For example, in MacArthur Bros. Co. v. Kerr, 213 N.Y. 360, 107 N.E.
572 (1915) the contract provided: ". . . further covenant and agree
to pay to said company or its representative all damages for which
said company or its representatives shall become responsible upon
said bond or undertaking before said company or its representatives
shall be compelled to pay the same . . . ." See also, Chermin v. International Oil Co., 261 Wis. 543, 53 N.W.2d 425 (1952); King v.
Capitol Amusement Co. 222 Ala. 115, 130 So. 799 (1930).
120 NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-206 (Reissue 1956); the action must be brought
within 5 years.
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loss, and the statute of limitations does not commence running
until that time.1 27 The problem is determining when the indemnitee has suffered loss.
In Thermopolis Northwest Electric Co. v. Ireland,128 the court
held loss accrued under the wording of the indemnity contract
when the indemnitee compromised and settled a suit against it.

In State v. Mills, 1 29 the indemnitor requested a surety to execute

a depository bond in favor of the state. The bank failed and
the state recovered judgment against the surety. Before the state
levied execution against the surety on the judgment, the surety
went bankrupt. The state, seeing it was useless to levy execution, failed to enforce the judgment. The state then brought an
action against the indemnitor on the theory that they were subrogated to the surety's rights on the indemnity contract. The
court held that the contract was one of indemnity against loss
and the surety had lost nothing, stating:
Where a stranger undertakes to indemnify a surety, such
undertaking does not create a trust in favor of creditors, nor can
they be subrogated to the surety's rights, and likewise, where a
stranger undertakes to indemnify a surety, and the surety thereafter becomes bankrupt so that it cannot pay any of its suretyship obligations . . .the legal representatives of such surety can-

not enforce the indemnity because such surety lost nothing, 13o
and
was not damaged and cannot be damnified by such judgment.
Under the theory of the holding, it would not have changed the
decision even if the state had levied execution against the surety.
If the indemnitor agrees to indemnify the surety against both
loss and liability, the statute of limitations does not commence
to run on the part against loss until the indemnitee has actually

127

See Cody v. Gaynes, 110 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1952); Borek v. Bazarewski,
21 N.Y.S.2d 916 (1940); Ramey v. Hopkins, 138 Cal. App. 685, 33
P.2d 443 (1934) where the bond provision was:

".

. . if the principal

shall indemnify the obligee against any loss or damage directly arising by reason of the failure of the principal to faithfully perform
said contract, then this obligation shall be void; otherwise to remain
in full force and effect." In respect to this provision the court stated:
"The distinction between an undertaking against 'liability' and the
strict contract of indemnity against 'loss' is that between contracting
that an event shall not happen, and contracting to indemnify against
the consequences of the event if it should happen."
128 119 F.2d 409 (10th Cir. 1941).
129 23 N.M. 549, 169 P. 1171 (1917).
130 Id. 556, 169 P. at 1173.
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suffered loss even though the statutory time has run against the
indemnity against liability.' 3'
Under the general contract rule, if the indemiiitor agrees to
do something other than indemnify the surety, for example, advance money or security for contingent claims against the indemnitee, a breach of the material covenant gives the indemnitee an
immediate 2right of action. The general rule is stated in Stuart
3
v. Carter:"

Whether an action lies or not, depends upon the true intent
and meaning of the covenant; if it is simply to indemnify, and
nothing more, then damages must be shown, before the plaintiff
can recover; but if there is an affirmative covenant to do a certain act, or pay certain sums of money, then it is no defense in
such an action to say that the plaintiff has not been damnified...
Where indemnity alone is expressed, it has always been held that
damage must be sustained before a recovery can be had; but
where there is a positive agreement to do the act which is to
prevent damage to the plaintiff, then
action lies, if the defendant
neglects or refuses to do such act." 33
IV. DISCHARGE OF THE INDEMNITOR
The general question discussed in this section is what acts
by the surety will discharge the indemnitor? The criterion used
in the few cases discussing the question seems to be whether the
surety's act prejudices the indemnitor or increases his risk.1
"3
The situations where the question has arisen are analogous to the
situations in which the question is what acts of a creditor will
discharge the surety. For example, extension of time for performance or payment by the surety without the consent of the
indemnitor; alteration of the principal contract without the con131 See Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Bros., 226 Minn. 466, 33 N.W.2d
46 (1948) where the indemnity contract contained the following provision:

".

.

. the indemnitors will pay over to the surety ...

sums of money which it ...

liable to pay on account of such suretyship .

132

133

134

all

shall pay or cause to be paid, or become
.

. such payment to be

made to the surety as soon as it shall have become liable therefore
." This was held to be indemnity against both liability and loss.
79 W.Va. 92, 90 S.E. 537 (1916). See also Fidelity & Casualty Co.
v. Angle, 243 N.C. 570, 91 S.E.2d 575 (1956); Loewenthal v. McElroy,
181 Mo. App. 399, 168 S.W. 813 (1914).
Stuart v. Carter, 79 W.Va. 92, 96, 90 S.E. 537, 539 (1916).
E.g., United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Putfark, 180 La. 893,
158 So. 9 (1934): "It is a general rule of law that any act on the
part of an indemnitee which materially increases the risk, or prejudices the rights of the indemnitor, will discharge the indemnitor
under the contract of indemnity."
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sent of the indemnitor; failure to proceed against the principal
debtor. This can be explained on the basis that the surety's third
party indemnitor, after payment to the surety, in fact becomes
a surety. 135 Hence, there is a correlation between acts which
prejudice an indemnitor and acts which prejudice a surety.
A. EXTENSION OF T=M
When the surety consents to an extension of time for payment or performance by the principal debtor without the consent of the surety's indemnitur, the few cases discussing the question hold the indemnitor is not discharged. 1 36 In reaching this
conclusion in German-American State Bank v. Bear,37 the court
stated:
The extension of the time for the payment of the notes did
not alter the terms of the indemnity contracts, and did not change
the liability of the defendant there under. 3 8
It should be noted that in this situation the rule applied to in39
demnitors is different from that applied to a surety.

B. MODIFICATION OF THE PRINcIPAL DEBTOR'S CONTRACT
It has been held that if the surety consents to a material
modification of the contract 140 which he has guaranteed, an indemnitor of the surety who has not consented to the modification
is discharged. 14' Although the court did not state the rationale
used for the result reached, it is submitted that the rationale used
to determine whether a surety is discharged by a modification of
the principal contract is applicable. Hence, any modification of
the principal debtor's contract will discharge the indemnitor either
on the theory that the modification increased his risk, or infringed

135 Restatement, Security § 82 comment 1.
136 See Northcott v. Nieman, 117 W.Va. 313, 185 S.E. 217 (1936); Wata-

nabe v. Ota, 137 Wash. 368, 242 P. 379 (1926); See Annot., 43 A.L.R.
1368 (1926).
137 111 Kan. 193, 206 P. 902 (1922).
138

Id. at 194, 206 P. at 903.

139 STERNS, SURETYSHIP

§ 6.16 (1951).

140

See Restatement, Contracts § 435.

141

In Kelsey Lumber Co. v. Rotsky, 178 S.W. 837 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915)
the court stated:
"The thousand dollars was deposited with the
Surety Company to indemnify it as surety upon the bond of Helm
under the first contract. Without the consent of Presley and John-
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on his rights. 1 42 It is questionable whether the rule that a noncompensated surety is discharged by any modification even though
beneficial to him will be applied to a third party indemnitor.

C.

SuRETY's FALURE TO PROCEED AGAINST THE
PR NcIPAL DEBTOR

It is not a condition precedent to recovery from the indemnitor, unless so stipulated in the contract, that the surety first
proceed against the principal debtor. The rule was stated iin
43

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Bank of Hattiesburg:
Clearly, therefore, this is an indemnity contract. And, in the
absence of any express agreement it was not a condition precedent to recovery that appellant, indemnitee, should have first
for the loss sustained from the principal
sought reimbursement
44
debtor.'
Since there is no duty to proceed against the principal debtor as
a condition precedent to proceeding against the indemnitor, in
45
the court held that the
Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. O'Bryan,1
failure to proceed against the principal debtor within a reasonable time does not discharge the indemnitor. The court stated:
Under the law, as we understand it, the laches or negligence
of the indemnitee that will release the indemnitors on a bond of
indemnity conditioned like the one here in question must be the
direct result of some act or conduct on the part of the indemnitee
but for which he would have suffered any loss. In otherwords,
when the indemnitee is sought to be made liable on his undertaking, he must not, by his laches or negligence, put upon the indemnitors a burden they would not otherwise be compelled to bear,
but his duty does not go to the extent of obliging the indemnitee
to bring suit against his principal or their parties to protect the
indemnitors or to take any steps to recover from his principal or
their parties the fund for which he has become liable on his undertaking. It is the business of the indemnitor to resort, for their
46
own protection, to remedies like these if they desire to do so.1
There are many other situations which might discharge the
indemnitor. For example, change in the principal's identity; failson (indemnitors) the Surety Company entered into the second contract, and both buildings were constructed as under one contract.
This is such an alteration as would release Presley and Johnson."
Also see Annot., 43 A.L.R. 1372 (1926).
142 SIMPSON, SURETYSHIP § 72 (1950).
143 128 Miss. 605, 91 So. 344 (1922).
144 Id. 91 So. at 346.
145 180 Ky. 277, 202 S.W. 645 (1918).
146 Id. 287, 202 S.W. at 646.
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ure of the surety to disclose material facts known about the principal and not known by the indemnitor; alteration by the surety
of the instrument expressing the principal debtor's obligation without the knowledge of the indemnitor. The author could find no
cases discussing these questions, however, it is submitted the answers may be similar to those that would be reached under the
law of suretyship.
V.

CONCLUSION

The discussion does not attempt to cover all of the problems
raised in the surety-third party indemnitor relationship, many of
which are undecided. In approaching the problems, it should be
remembered that the surety-creditor relationship is similar in many
respects to the surety-indemnitor relationship, and in some areas
such as where the question is whether the indemnitor is discharged,
the rationale and arguments applicable to the former have been
applied to the latter.
Robert K. McCa~la, '61

